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Witnesses: A Canonist's View 
by WILLIAM HAMILTON BRYSON * 
THE PREVAILING OPINI.ON regarding the history of equity proce-dure is that it came through chancery from the medieval eccle-
siastical courts. The connection between the English high court 
of chancery and the courts Christian is due to . the practice of the 
medieval English kings of recruiting their chief advisers, the chan-
cellors, from the ranks of the native episcopacy. As the secular 
chancery developed its court, the chancellor quite naturally adopted 
those procedures which were most familiar to him, which were 
those of his own consistory. Also many of the bishops who became 
chancellors had studied civil (Roman) law and canon law in the 
universities, but few had had much professional contact with the 
cruder procedures of the common law courts. Thus the situation 
of the court is a unique substance of lay justice administered by 
means of a procedure which is basically ecclesiastical, the Romano-
canonical procedure. 
The purpose of this essay is to examine and compare with our 
present practices a medieval text or summary of canonical proce-
dure, the Summa de Ordine /udiciario by Ricardus Anglicus-more 
narrowly, chapter XXX, which is concerned with witnesses. There 
are several reasons for examining the work of Ricardus Anglicus. 
This Englishman was a brilliant canonist in an age when the most 
ingenious and aggressive intellectuals were gravitating to the field 
of canon and civil law. Also he gives us a rather full summary of 
the subject. 
Ricardus Anglicus has definitely been identified as Richard of 
Mores who was born in Lincolnshire in the second half of the 
twelfth century and who died in 1242. We find him first mentioned 
as being in Paris around 1186, 1187. It is probable that he went 
from there back to England to the University at Oxford. He was 
in Bologna during the pontificate of Celestine III (1191-1198) where 
he was a student and then a well-known and highly regarded pro-
fessor of canon law; in fact he was one of the first English canon-
ists at Bologna. By 1198 he was back again in England, and dur-
ing the years 1198 through 1202 he was in professional association 
• Research Student, Christ's College, Cambri~ge University. 
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with Hubert Walter, the archbishop of Canterbury and chancellor 
of England.1 He was a canon of Merton, and in 1202 he was elected 
prior of the monastery at Dunstable. Ricardus left the court of 
the archbishop at this . time but continued to be active in public 
administration. He went several times to Rome: in 1203 on behalf 
of King John and in 1216 to attend the Fourth Lateran Council. 
Nevertheless he remained always an academician at heart.2 
The Summa de ordine iudicia1·io was written in 1196 in Bologna. 
This work was immediately successful and was well known in west-
ern Europe. However, it was soon superceded; it was antiquated 
by the end of the thirteenth century and generally forgotten. It 
is not incautious to assume that Ricardus had a copy with him when 
he was in the service of Hubert Walter and that his patron and 
his colleagues, the vice-chancellors, were familiar with it.3 
Ricardus' summa is not a well-structured treatise, but rather 
it is a collection of well chosen quotations similar to the Corpus 
Juris Civilis of Justinian, upon which it so heavily relies. In the 
section on witnesses, every single paragraph is taken from the works 
of another; however, every thought is properly cited as being that 
of another with one exception in which the citation precedes the 
quotation by several pages. The only original words of Ricardus 
in this section are the introductions .to the quotations, but even 
here the substance is not original. The quotations which comprise 
this section were taken from three sources: Justinian, Gratian, 
and Bernard of Pavia. The sections of the Corpus Juris Civilis 
used primarily are the three sections entitled "de testibus" ("wit-
nesses"), i.e. Digest, XXII. 5; Code, IV. 20; and Novel 90. In fact, 
the quotations from these three sections make up about seventy-five 
percent of the total chapter; this is to be expected since the eccle-
siastical procedure was closely derived from the Roman model. Six 
of the seven citations to Gratian are to the second part, causa III, 
1 C. E. Lewis, "Ricardus Anglicus, A 'Familiaris' of Archbishop 
Hubert Walter," 22 Traditio 469-471 (1966). 
2 S. Kuttner, Dictionnaire de droit canonique, vol. 7, col's. 676-681; 
S. Kuttner and E. Rathbone, "Anglo-Norman Canonists of the Twelfth 
Century," 7 Traditio 279, 327-339 (1949-1951); L. Wahrmund, Quellen 
zur Geschichte des Romisch-Kanonischen Prozesses im Mittelalter, vol. 2, 
part 3 (1915). 
3 Campbell is of the opinion that Walter did not attend to the duties 
of chancellor himself since he constantly employed vice-chancellors. 1 Lives 
of the Chancellors 116-118 (7th ed., 1885). However, it is not known what 
their duties were; it could be that Campbell's view is anachronistic. 
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of his Decretum. Four of the five references to the Compilatio 
Prima (1192) of Bernard of Pavia are to book II, title 13. This 
summa is nevertheless a very helpful work for us and was for the 
medieval practitioners and judges also. We have much more than 
a mere form book; it is a summary of the law. 
The arrangement of ideas within Ricardus' work is somewhat 
haphazard, and so I will discuss them in an order which seems to 
me to be easier to follow. I have divided the material into three 
parts: competency, mode of examination, and substance of exami-
nation. 
The competency of witnesses was determined by the judge. 
The criteria for this determination were designed to exclude those 
who would be most likely to commit perjury for various reasons. 
The language of this section seems to indicate that there was to 
have been a voir dire, because the judge was to allow a witness 
to testify only if he was satisfied that he would not perjure him-
self. The most important, certainly the most emphasized, criterion 
was integrity and good reputation; truthfulness in the past should 
be a fair indication of veracity in the future. Also the social status 
or rank of the proposed witness should be considered; the upper 
classes would be better educated and more conscious of the duty 
to testify truthfully. The wealthy witness was to be preferred over 
the poor one since the temptation to swear falsely for money would 
be less. Friendship, moreover; with one of the parties was to be 
noted, as was enmity towards the opposite party. And in addition 
the judge should observe the manner, bearing-shifty-eyes, sweaty 
palms, nervous fidgeting-and general behavior of the witness. This 
seems to be an attempt to exclude from court those who will detract 
from the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings by ill manners 
as well as by false testimony. Furthermore, those who hesitate in 
answering or give contradicting answers should be rejected. 
The above-mentioned criteria are matters within the discre-
tion of the judge However, there are several classes of persons 
who are legally prohibited from testifying. Neither a freedman nor 
his immediate family nor his spouse can testify against his former 
master or his patron or vice versa. This is the privilege of the 
party; note also that the freedman can testify on behalf of his 
patron. Slaves are completely incompetent to testify. If a proposed 
witness is asserted to be in servitude, then his evidence will be 
taken and then, if it can be proved that he is free, his evidence can 
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be used, if not it will be quashed. This disqualification of slaves 
was copied from the Roman law to refer to serfs or villeins.4 
The disability of foreigners and unknown persons seems to 
reflect a natural distrust of strangers. It is consistent with the 
above-mentioned preference for witnesses with good reputations, 
for these persons have no reputation at all. 
As to family and depen~ents of the adversary party, there 
seems to be a conflict in the rules. At one place these persons seem 
to be allowed to testify against their kin and master, only if they so 
desire (and dare). But two paragraphs later they seem to be abso-
lutely prohibited from testifying at all. The purposes of these two 
paragraphs, however, are not in conflict; the purpose of the second 
is to protect the outsider from the bias of witnesses who are kin 
to or under the control of the other party. This purpose is not frus-
trated nor is the outsider at all prejudiced by the voluntary testimony 
of the relatives of the adversary party against said adversary. The 
purpose of the first is to protect the integrity of the family by not 
allowing a stranger to turn one member against another and to en-
courage familial closeness by protecting shared confidences. 
In regard to the disability of witnesses who are "under sus-
picion," "unfriendly," "not of good behavior," etc., it need only be 
pointed out that these conditions are so vague that each case must 
be entirely in the discretion of the judge, and thus we have only a 
repetition of the rules of competence discussed above. 
Finally, if a witness is produced who has at the same time a 
lawsuit pending with the other party, this party may object if the 
witness holds an enmity towards him because of said pending liti-
gation. If the suit with the witness is of a criminal nature, then 
his testimony cannot be taken until after the said suit is terminated. 
If it is a civil case, then the testimony of the witness will be taken, 
but it cannot be used until after the litigation with the witness 
has ended. This rule is based on the premise that the witness is 
liable to commit perjury out of malice for the party who also has 
a suit against him, but that, after the suit is ended, the witness's 
antagonism will abate. This rationale, however, does not explain 
why, in the case of a civil suit between the witness and party, the 
witness can give his testimony but it cannot be used until after that 
suit is ended. The Romans and the canon lawyers recognized the 
4 In England at this time only free persons could appear in the com-
mon law courts as witnesses, whether a champion: Glanvill II, 3; or a 
compurgator: Glanvill V, 6; or member of a grand assize: Glanvill II, 11 
and IX, 7; or a petite assize:· Glanvill XIII, 3, 4, 7, etc. 
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greater dangers of criminal prosecutions; here may be the key to 
the answer. Perhaps the witness would attempt to injure and 
harass by means of perjury the other party in his action against 
the witness. Perhaps the preferable method of dealing with the 
problem, as in the cases of criminal suits, could not be allowed for 
reasons of the efficiency of judicial administration in cases of civil 
suits, which tend to be more complicated and drawn out. 
The next topic to be considered is the mode of examination. 
The witness is to be examined in court by a judge. Since the argu-
ment and exceptions to the evidence take place at a later time, and 
since the witness can be examined several times, it can be inferred 
that the testimony was written down in the form of a deposition. 
Also the language about the publication of the evidence strongly 
suggests a written deposition. 
Usually the same judge who will eventually decide the case 
hears the witnesses. However, there are several exceptions to this 
rule, and in certain special cases the judge sends out one of his 
subordinate officers to take the deposition of a witness. This is done 
where the testimony of a bishop is needed, out of respect for his 
sacerdotal dignity. Also the fairer sex are allowed to give evidence 
by means of depositions taken in their own homes. This deference 
to feminine delicacy was taken from a very adamant Roman order. 
If a witness is too ill or feeble to be brought to court, then 
his deposition can be taken at his home. And if a witness resides 
in another jurisdiction, his deposition can be taken before certain 
officials in that jurisdiction and sent back to the judge before whom 
the action is pending. There must have been a commission under 
seal and notice to adverse parties; the judgment must be rendered 
by the judge in whose court the proceedings were initiated; and 
this is allowed only in civil cases. 
Witnesses are to be examined in the presence of both parties. 
However, if one party having been given due notice refuses to 
appear, then he is estopped to object to any of the questions or 
responses or to the ex parte nature of the proceedings. A party will 
not be permitted to deprive his opponent of the use of evidence by 
merely refusing to be present at the examination of witnesses. 
Any person who is not forbidden or excused from testifying 
may be compelled to come to court and give evidence. We have 
already discussed those persons who are forbidden or incompetent 
to testify; so now let us turn to those who are excused from giving 
testimony if they do not care to. 
No person can be compelled to testify against his immediate 
family if he is unwilling. This rule states the privilege of the wit-
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ness not the party. It lists the most distant kin covered by the ex-
emption and then includes all those related in any nearer degree; 
since fathers-in-law and sons-in-law are listed, then wives must be 
included in this privilege. 
Furthermore, old persons, invalids, soldiers, and magistrates 
absent on official business have the privilege of refusing to testify, 
if they wish to shirk their duties towards the administration of 
justice. 
Before testifying the prospective witness should be sworn; 
the substance of his oath should be that he will tell the truth and 
not testify because of partiality or hatred towards any party or 
through fear or because of any remuneration. He also should swear 
that what he would testify to was told to him by his ancestor;" I 
assume that this part of the oath refers only to matters beyond his 
own percipiency. It is clear that a witness is to be impartial in his 
testimony and not the flaming partisan of the party who produced 
him. 
The judge is empowered to punish persons who have committed 
perjury, according to the nature of the offense. 
Usually the competency of a proposed witness is determined be-
fore he is sworn, but Ricardus mentions two situations in which 
the evidence is taken under reservation. In the first situation, if 
the witness can later prove that he is not a slave as asserted by the 
other party, then his testimony will be allowed. In the second, the 
evidence of a witness who has a civil suit pending against the other 
party may be taken and held in abeyance until his said suit has 
been concluded.6 These rules undoubtedly saved time and expense of 
the parties, the witnesses, and the courL 
In civil cases, if it were necessary, a witness could give his 
testimony in camera in order to protect his rights. 
The general rule is that witnesses can be examined only three 
times before publication of their testimony; they cannot be brought 
back after publication except on new articles, i.e. set of questions. 
However, they can be brought in a fourth time or after publication, 
if a party objects to the evidence as improper or incomplete or if 
the other party has made an objection after the third time. It 
should be noted that the party producing the same person a fourth 
time must give an oath that he has not suppressed evidence or acted 
deceitfully but that he has not been able to use the evidence already 
5 Cf. the oath of the demandant in reference to his champion in an 
action of right: Glanvill II, 3. 
G See supra. 
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given. No fourth production will be allowed after a long interval; 
the parties will not be allowed to protract the litigation unneces-
sarily; it is the judge's responsibility to see that justice is admin-
istered as expeditiously as possible. Thus after a witness has com-
pleted testifying and after his testimony has been published and 
made available to the parties, both parties have the right to object 
to it and recall the witness, if the judge finds defects or incom-
pleteness in his testimony. 
A witness has the right to be reimbursed for his proper ex-
penses, i.e., those incurred by his being required to be present in 
court, by the party who summoned him. But, of course, he is not 
to accept money to pervert the substance of his testimony. 
The third and final section is the substance of the examina-
tion, what sort of things the witness should testify about and in 
what manner, etc. 
The witness should tell the whole truth in his answer but he 
should limit his answer to matters which are material to the dis-
pute between the litigants. 'J.'he three citations at the end of the 
third paragraph are to three diverse sections of the Corpus Juris 
Civilis in which rights of action are restricted in various ways; for 
these three sections to be germane and for the entire paragraph to 
make any sense, this paragraph must have been intended to refer 
to the inadmissibility of immaterial evidence, i.e., evidence tending 
to establish a proposition not in issue. 
The witness should not only testify to those things of which 
he has first-hand knowledge but also to that which he learned from 
others. However, he cannot testify as to what he has been told by 
the plaintiff or whatever the defendant has told him after the litis-
contestation. This is a reasonable restriction on the general admis-
sion of hearsay evidence; there is no reason to allow the parties 
to testify indirectly through their witnesses and thereby swell the 
record wtih a glut of self-serving verbiage. It seems to me strange 
that the defendant is allowed to thus "educate" his witnesses up 
to the time of the litiscontestation, for surely he would be well 
aware of the issues to be determined long before this point has 
been reached. 
A party cannot prove a point by the evidence of a single wit-
ness; there must be at least two, but two is sufficient, and the in-
ference is that no more should be produced. The judge should not 
be· burdened by evidence which is merely cumulative. 
The witness should answer clearly, simply, without qualifica-
tions, without embellishment. 
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Having considered the rules of evidence set out by Ricardus, 
it remains for us to examine these rules by comparison with cur-
rent American ideas and practices in order to determine which ones 
have eternal validity and universal application and which ones were 
made to suit local conditions and attitudes which change as each 
generation rebels against its predecessor. The times are constantly 
changing, and some rules follow the times, others do not. This 
essay is centered around Ricardus' summa, and so it is unnecessary 
to mention those rules of evidence not discussed therein. And one 
further point-it is not necessary to discuss the relative functions 
of the judge and jury since there was no jury in Romano-canoni-
cal procedure. 
In the area of the qualifications of the competent witness there 
has been reform of the magnitude approaching revolution. Ricar-
dus mentions as criteria for competency good reputation, education, 
personal bias for or against one of the parties for various reasons, 
demeanor, inconsistency on voir dire, professional bias, social 
status, wealth, domicil, etc. These situations and conditions are still 
today recognized as relevant to the likelihood of truthful testi-
mony; however, instead of going to the initial question of compe-
tency, these are matters of credibility and weight of the evidence 
which are to be dealt with in the final argument or summation to 
the jury. 
The only type of restriction mentioned by Ricardus which 
exists today is the privilege of spouse not to testify against spouse 
in a criminal prosecution unless both are willing that the testi-
mony should be given.7 The reason that this rule has been retained 
is not because of any probability of perjury but because it is good 
public policy to protect marital relationships by not subjecting them 
to this situation which suborns the loyalty of the spouse.8 
The present practices of allowing persons in these various 
relationships and situations to testify are good. Many have mis-
givings as to the abilities of juries to winnow the evidence, but it 
is my opinion that in the stiff breeze of the summation the chaff 
will be quite blown away. The reason behind the restrictive rules of 
the Romano-canonical procedure, to prevent anticipated perjury, is 
not great enough to outweigh the general policy of broad admis-
sibility, which was recognized then as now. Clearly the medicine 
is worse than the illness. 
7 CODE OF VA., sec. 8-287 (repl. vol. 1957), sec. 8-288 (cum. supp. 
1966). 
s But see contra 2 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 600-604 (3rd ed., 1940) 
and 8 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 2227, 2228 (rev., 1961). 
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The next topic to be considered is the mode of examination. 
In the Romano-canonical system the general modus operandi was 
for the judge to question the witness upon interrogatories prepared 
by the parties. The responses of the witness were written down as 
a deposition; then at a later stage of the litigation, after publica-
tion, the parties could argue any exceptions. The most significant 
thing here is that the depositions were taken before the judge who 
would decide the case so that he had the benefit of demeanor evi-
dence, the lack of which was one of the great criticisms of the 
process of taking eviden~e in chancery. Today most evidence is 
given orally in court in the presence of the judge and jury and more 
and more frequently in chancery also. But today when depositions 
are used in any court, the demeanor evidence is lost because they 
are now taken by the attorneys of the parties; the only court official 
present is the reporter, who passively records the proceedings. 
The general rule in canon law was that the witnesses were 
brought to the judge; however, there were appropriate exceptions 
where this rule would consistently involve hardship, and examiners 
would be sent out to bishops, women, and invalids. Today we no 
longer grant this favor to the first two classes, but of course the 
necessity of using the depositions of invalids continues. If the 
parties cannot go to his bedside, then his testimony will be lost. 
As mentioned above, the examination is conducted by the attorneys, 
therefore examiners are no longer needed or used. 
Then as now, if a witness resides outside of the jurisdiction 
of the court, his deposition may be taken where he resides and re-
turned to the court in which the lawsuit is pending. In this case it 
is felt that the convenience to the witness and the reduction of 
expense to the parties outweighs the value of the demeanor evi-
dence. Today it is not necessary to have a commission to take a 
deposition. 
Although at canon law magistrates, soldiers, and invalids had 
the privilege not to testify at all if they did not care to, under the 
current system they do not enjoy this privilege. However, the 
depositions of certain public officials can be used more freely than 
those of the ordinary garden-variety people. Their depositions can 
be taken at a time and place that will not seriously inconvenience 
them; the time and place can be set to suit them, since the judge 
need not be present. If the judge is required to be on hand, as in 
the canon law procedure, then everyone else's schedule must be 
conformed to his. The principle behind these rules is that the per-
formance of public duties of important officials should not be im-
paired by requiring these men to spend their time in court in 
matters which do not concern the state. 
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In both systems the effective administration of justice has 
shown that the witnesses must be able to be compelled to testify 
and to testify under oath and to be punished for perjury. Both par-
ties should be present at the giving of testimony; however, if due 
notice has been given, the other party is estopped to object to an 
ex parte proceeding. This makes the availability of cross-interroga-
tories meaningful. 
As to the amount of testimony, Ricardus infers that three 
productions of a witness is the normal limit; this would allow for 
a cross-examination and a re-direct as in our current practice in 
the court room. In taking depositions today, there is no limit on 
the number of times a witness can be compelled to depose; however, 
since the attorneys now ask the questions and cross-examine at the 
end of the direct examination, it is seldom more than one. The judge 
has full power to remedy the abusive use of depositions in any case. 
Ricard us also admits that interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium. 
In Romano-canonical law, the witness had the right to reim-
bursement of his expenses in connection with his giving testimony. 
He does not have this right in our system; however, as a general 
rule, the party that produced him will repay him for his expenses. 
Modern judges have no trouble distinguishing these payments 
from bribes. After all he usually has no personal interest in the 
suit; if others benefit from his efforts and time, they should pay 
for it. 
In both systems the testimony is limited by the conception of 
materiality; it is too obvious to mention that a lawsuit must have 
some sort of boundary. 
The canon law courts allowed the witnesses to give hearsay 
evidence. The reasons we today do not allow it is that a jury is not 
felt to be able to cope with it as well as a judge, but principally 
because of the modern emphasis on the importance of cross-exami-
nation. However, the innumerable modern exceptions to the hear-
say rule indicate that its original purpose was to exclude evidence 
which was of lesser value, and at the same time these exceptions 
suggest that the rule is not a foreordained, immutable decree of the 
Fates. 
The refusal of the canonists to accept the uncorroborated 
testimony of a single witness ill a precaution which is not found 
in Anglo-American law. It would appear obvious to us that one 
witness is better than none and that lack of corroboration is a 
question of weight rather than competency, but it is not to the 
civilians. 
Both systems attempt to expedite the course of the trial by 
discouraging the production of witnesses whose testimony is un-
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necessarily cumulative and by encouraging witnesses to testify 
clearly and directly. 
In all that has gone before, we have been examining various 
rules of evidence to determine their efficacy in bringing the true 
facts before the court and in keeping from the ears of the court 
lies, misstatements, and exaggerations. The success of these rules 
along these lines is absolutely essential to the cause of justice. If 
the rules of evidence do not perform their functions, then the court 
is a travesty. The courts should be accessible to all persons, and 
thus the rules of evidence should promote the efficient and inex-
pensive use of witnesses. What good is a court, if it is so clogged 
with business that it cannot hear your case or if it is so expensive 
that you cannot afford to appear in it? In pursuing these goals, it 
is well to keep in mind the principles, purposes, and experiences of 
other systems, especially the more advanced ones, such as the canon 
and civil laws, upon which we have leaned heavily in the past. 
